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Abstract 
This study measures the effect of industrial robots on workplace safety at the commuting zone level, 
exploiting potentially exogenous variation in robot exposure due to technological progress. Workplace 
safety is measured by workers involved in severe or fatal accidents inspected by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration. From 2000 to 2007, we find that one additional robot in exposure per 1,000 
workers decreased the OSHA accident rate at the mean by 15.1 percent. We also find that robot 
exposure decreased OSHA violations and accidents more likely to be affected by robot penetration, 
specifically those involving machinery or electrical. 
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1 Introduction
Workplace safety in the US has improved substantially during the last three decades,
but the mechanisms for this trend remain understudied. From 1993 to 2018, the rate of
work-related injuries and illnesses decreased by 67.1 percent, from 8.5 per 100-full time
equivalent workers to 2.8, and the rate of work-related fatalities decreased by 30 percent,
from 5 per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers to 3.5 (Figure 1). Moreover, workplace safety
improved within most industries, including construction and manufacturing, suggesting that
the aggregate improvement in workplace safety does not simply reflect shifts in employment
towards safer industries. In an article for the popular press, Krueger (2000) noted the
improvements in workplace safety and discussed potential mechanisms.1 In addition to
rising incomes and costs of workers’ compensation, he argued that capital investment likely
decreased work-related injuries and illnesses, noting that the improvement in workplace
safety in the early 1990s coincided with an investment boom when firms invested substantially
in new - and potentially safer - facilities and equipment.
Motivated by this argument, we attempt to identify the effect of technological
progress on workplace safety. We focus specifically on automation technology due to in-
dustrial robots using the empirical strategy of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020).2 According
to data from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), the use of industrial robots
increased steadily in the US and Europe as early as 1993 (Figure 1), the first year in which
data on robot penetration are available. Notably, the increased penetration of industrial
robots in the US occurred in tandem with improvements in workplace safety. To examine
causality, we examine the relationship between robot exposure and workplace safety at both
the industry and commuting zone levels. At the commuting zone level, the measure of robot
exposure combines variation in industry composition with industry-level changes in robot
1“Economic Scene; Fewer workplace injuries and illnesses are adding to economic strength.” September
14, 2000. New York Times.
2An industrial robot is defined as automatically controlled, reprogrammable, and multipurpose (Interna-
tional Federation of Robotics, 2014)
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penetration, similar to a Bartik (1991) instrument. To further isolate changes in robot ex-
posure due to technological change, changes in robot penetration by industry are measured
using data from Europe.3
The primary data on workplace safety come from the Integrated Management Infor-
mation System (IMIS) (OSHA, 2021), a database of inspections conducted by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). We focus primarily on OSHA inspections
due to severe exposures and accidents resulting in death or hospitalization of three or more
employees, which we refer to as OSHA accidents. The OSHA accident rate is calculated
as the number of workers involved in severe or fatal accidents per 100,000 workers, with
employment figures derived from County Business Patterns (CBP).4 The advantage of the
OSHA accident rate - in comparison to rates of injuries and fatalities from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) - is that it can be calculated at the commuting zone level. Using
industry level data, we show that the OSHA accident rate is highly correlated with the BLS
fatality rate. Using the IMIS data, we also consider measures of OSHA enforcement from
all inspections, not just those associated with severe or fatal accidents. The enforcement
variables include the rate of inspections as well as violations and penalties as a result of
inspections. If violations and penalties are indicative of workplace hazards and predictive
of workplace accidents, then violations and penalties may also be viewed as measures of
workplace safety.
We first examine correlations between robot penetration and workplace safety at
the industry level, revealing several notable patterns. First, robot penetration from 1993 to
2007 was greater in more dangerous industries, measured by the BLS accident rate in 1993.
There was no correlation, however, between robot penetration from 1993 to 2007 and the
OSHA accident rate in 1993. Second, robot penetration from 1993 to 2007 was negatively
correlated with the OSHA accident rate over the same period. This finding is consistent with
3The data for Europe come specifically from Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden. For the US,
robot data by industry are only available since 2004.
4Lee and Taylor (2019) and Sojourner and Yang (2020) also measure workplace safety based on OSHA
inspections due to severe and fatal accidents.
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the conclusion that robot penetration improved workplaced safety. Third, robot penetration
from 1993 to 2007 was not correlated with pre-existing trends in the OSHA accident rate,
measured from 1986 to 1993. Thus, the negative correlation between robot penetration and
the OSHA accident rate from 1993 to 2007 cannot be explained pre-existing trends.
We then estimate the effect of robot exposure on workplace safety at the commuting
zone level. Following Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020), we estimate both a long difference
model from 1993 to 2007 and a stacked differences model from 1993 to 2000 and from
2000 to 2007. We find no effect of robot exposure using the long difference, but find a
negative effect using stacked differences. To understand the different results, we estimate
the effect separately from 1993 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2007 and find that the negative
effect occurred entirely in the latter period. The point estimate implies that a one robot
increase in exposure per 1,000 workers decreased the OSHA accident rate at the mean by
15.1 percent. In comparison, the weighted average increase in robot exposure from 2000 to
2007 was 1.38 per 1,000 workers, and the OSHA accident rate in 2000 was 4.92 per 100,000
workers.5
We then estimate the effect of robot exposure on OSHA enforcement. We find
negative and, in most cases, statistically significant effects of robot exposure on OSHA
violations and penalties. To further assess whether the effect of robot exposure on violations
can be attributed to robots, we estimate the effects separately by violation type, focusing
on the ten most frequent types of violations in 1993. For each violation, we calculate an
index of robot exposure based on the frequency of violations by type and industry and robot
penetration by industry. We find that the negative effect of robot exposure on violations is
most evident for those most exposed to robot penetration.
The results contribute to the literature on the labor market effects of robots.6
5The average is calculated across commuting zones from 2000 to 2007, weighted by employment.
6Recent contributions to the literature include Acemoglu et al. (2020); Dauth et al. (2021); Findeisen
et al. (2021); Kugler et al. (2020); Dinlersoz and Wolf (2018). A closely related working paper by Gihleb
et al. (2020) examines the effects of industrial robots on workplace safety in the US and Germany. Consistent
with our results, they conclude that robot exposure decreased workplace accidents.
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Graetz and Michaels (2018) attribute the rapid adoption of industrial robots in the US from
1990 to 2005 to an 80 percent decline in the cost of robots. By comparing county pairs from
1993 to 2005, they conclude that industrial robots increased annual labor productivity, but
did not significantly affect employment. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) identify the effect of
robot exposure on wages and employment using community-zone variation in robot exposure
based on industry composition. They find robust negative effects of industrial robots on
both wages and employment. Our findings suggest that robot penetration also improved
workplace safety, either by displacing hazardous employment or by making employment
safer. Improvements in workplace safety may also contribute to a decline wages, given that
hazardous work conditions must be compensated with higher wages according to hedonic
wage theory (Rosen, 1974).
2 Empirical Model
The empirical objective is to estimate the effect of robot exposure on workplace
safety in the US. Following Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020), the empirical strategy exploits
variation in robot exposure by commuting zone. The model is given by the following equa-
tion:
∆Yct = β0 + β1∆Robotsct + β2Xct + τt + εct. (1)
∆Yct is the change in workplace safety in commuting zone c in period t, and ∆Robotsct is the
change in robot exposure. The model controls for commuting zone characteristics Xct and
period fixed effects τt. The standard errors εct are robust and clustered at the commuting
zone level.
To isolate potentially exogenous variation in robot exposure, we calculate the pre-
dicted change in robots for each commuting zone based on industry composition and robot
penetration by industry. This is the empirical strategy of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020)
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based on the Bartik (1991) instrument. Specifically, robot exposure for each commuting
zone is calculated using the following equation:
∑
∆Robotsct = lcit∆APRit. (2)
i
The term lcit is the share of employment in commuting zone c dedicated to industry i at
period t, and ∆APRit is the aggregate change in robot penetration in industry i, adjusted
for robot growth due to industry expansion. A general formula for the latter is given by the
following equation:
Mit′ −Mit Mit
∆APRit = − git (3)
Lit Lit
The first term measures the increase in robots relative to employment, and the second term
adjusts for changes in robots due to industry growth git.
The identification assumption is that, by measuring robot exposure based on ag-
gregate trends in robot penetration, the variation in exposure is due to systemic factors such
as technological progress and thus exogenous to the structural error term at the commuting
zone level in equation (1). If robot exposure were instead measured by actual robot pene-




Robot exposure is measured using survey data from the International Federation of
Robotics (IFR).7 Since 1993, the IFR has collected annual information on industrial robots
7The IFR data come from Acemoglu and Restrepo (2021).
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for over 50 countries. For many European countries, the data were collected by year and
industry since 1993. For the US, aggregate data have been collected since 1993, but data by
industry are available only for 2004 onwards. When reported by industry, the IFR utilizes
19 broad classifications, 13 of which are in manufacturing.
To estimate the effect of robot exposure on workplace safety using equation (1),
we utilize IFR data provided by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) and follow their convention.
First, we estimate a long-difference model between 1993 and 2007 and a stacked difference
model between 1993 and 2000 and 2000 and 2007. Second, to construct the adjusted measure
of robot penetration in equation (3), we use robot data for five European countries: Denmark,
Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden. Specifically, the adjusted robot penetration is calculated
using the following equation:
( )∑ j
Euro 1 M ′ −it M
j M j
∆APRit =






In contrast to equation (3), the denominator is constructed using data in 1990. As Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2020) argue, using robot data from Europe further ensures that the measure
of robot penetration reflects technological progress and thus exogenous to workplace safety
in equation (1).
An alternative approach is to measure predicted robot exposure using aggregate US
data at the industry level, but instrument the US-based measure with the European-based
measure in equation (4). Because US data by industry is available only for 2004 onwards,
the earliest possible baseline year is 2004. The measure of robot penetration for the US is
calculated using the following equation:
( )
US Mit′ −Mi,2004 Mi,2004∆APRi,2004 = − git . (5)Li,1990 Li,1990
Intuitively, the instrumental variable approach isolates variation in predicted US robot pen-
etration based on aggregate US data in equation (5) that is attributable to the predicted US
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robot penetration based on aggregate European data in equation (4).
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) document important properties of the robot ex-
posure measures, which we briefly discuss. First, the US-based measure in equation (5) is
highly correlated with the European-based measure in equation (4). This suggests robot
penetration in the US is driven largely by technological progress. Second, the European-
based measure in equation (4) does not appear to mimic other industry-level trends, such
as import competition and offshoring. Third, the geographic variation in robot penetration
is substantial. This variation persists even after excluding the automotive industry, which
experienced the largest increase in robot penetration. Finally, robot exposure was associated
with the number of robot integrators at the commuting zone level.8 This suggests that the
measures of robot exposure indeed reflect robot-related activity.
3.2 OSHA Accidents
To measure workplace safety as an outcome variable to equation (1), we use data on
OSHA inspections resulting from severe or fatal accidents. The data on OSHA inspections
come from the IMIS (OSHA, 2021), which contains information on inspections as early as
1984. For each inspection record, the IMIS reports the name and address of the inspected
establishment and the findings of the investigation. Importantly, if under OSHA jurisdiction,
OSHA is required to investigate work-related accidents resulting in death or hospitalization
of three or more employees.9 In these cases, the IMIS also includes Fatality and Catastrophe
Investigation Summaries from OSHA Form 170. Because the criteria for an inspection based
on severe or fatal accidents are clear and relatively objective, we use these inspections to
measure workplace safety, which we refer to as OSHA accidents.
The OSHA accident rate is calculated as the number of workers involved in an acci-
dent resulting in death or hospitalization of three or more employees per 100,000 workers by
8The data on robot integrators come from Leigh and Kraft (2018)
9OSHA standard 1960.29(b) reads, “In any case, each accident which results in a fatality or the hospital-
ization of three or more employees shall be investigated to determine the causal factors involved.”
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commuting zone and period. In our analysis, we do not analyze fatalities and hospitalizations
separately, as the data on fatalities are inconsistent.10 To reduce noise, we calculate annual
rates using a three-year average. For example, for the numerator in 1993, we calculate the
annual average of accidents that occurred in 1993, 1994, and 1995. Inspections are assigned
to commuting zones based on the zip code reported in the IMIS. For the denominator, we
tally employment by commuting zone using CBP.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides data on workplace safety, but these
data are insufficient for estimating equation (1). The first data source comes from Survey
of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII). These data report the total recordable case
(TRC) rate per 100 full-time equivalent workers. The TRC rate reflects illness and injuries
involving days away from work, job restrictions, and job transfers. The second data source
comes from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). These data report the fatality
rate per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers. Both the SOII and CFOI data are available
by year and industry, but not by commuting zone, and thus cannot be used for estimating
equation (1).
Importantly, the OSHA accident rate that we derive from the IMIS is not directly
comparable to the TRC rate or fatality rate computed by the BLS. In fact, during the
analysis period, the number of OSHA accidents equals about 70% of the number of total
fatalities reported in the CFOI. One reason is that OSHA does not have jurisdiction over
all workplace fatalities; for example, fatalities due to motor vehicle accidents that occur on
public roads or highways.
To compare the correlation between the OSHA accident rate and the BLS rates,
we calculate the OSHA accident rate by IFR industry using the SIC code reported in the
IMIS. Figure 2 illustrates scatter plots of the OSHA accident rate and the BLS rates by
10The IMIS data include two variables on fatalities, one at the accident level and one at the individual
level. However, when compared, the information on fatalities is highly inconsistent. For example, conditional
on no fatality at the accident level, the individual level variable indicates that 14 percent of workers had died.
We are therefore hesitant to draw definitive conclusions based on these variables and simply highlight the
industry-level correlations between the OSHA accident rate and BLS fatality rates, illustrated in Figure 2.
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industry in 1993, where the relative sizes of the scatter points are proportional to relative
employment in each industry.11 As shown, the OSHA accident rate is positively correlated
with both BLS rates, but the correlation weighted by employment is greater for the fatality
rate than the TRC rate: 0.92 versus 0.58. The high correlation between the OSHA accident
rate and the BLS fatality rate, combined with the fact that workplace safety is measured as
changes rather than levels in equation (1), provides assurance that the OSHA accident rate
is a reasonable measure of workplace safety, with the important advantage that it can be
calculated at the commuting zone level.
3.3 OSHA Enforcement
We also consider broader measures of OSHA enforcement using the IMIS. Specif-
ically, we consider whether an establishment was inspected for any reason, not just due to
severe or fatal accidents, as well as the violations and monetary penalties as a result of in-
spections. The violations and penalties are reported in separate files, which we merge to the
inspection records.
For these measures, the rate is calculated per establishment by commuting zone,
rather than by employment, as these outcomes occur at the establishment level. Again, we
calculate annual rates using a three-year average. For the numerator, we calculate the annual
average of any inspection, any violation, and any penalty. For violations and penalties, we
also calculate the annual average of the number of violations and penalty amounts, with the
latter converted to 2020 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. For the denominator, we
tally establishments by commuting zone using CBP.
We note that OSHA enforcement outcomes are not direct measures of workplace
safety. For example, the number of OSHA inspections may simply reflect administrative
capacity rather than workplace safety. On the other hand, a negative association between
11The agricultural sector is excluded as the injuries and illnesses are likely to be underestimated (Leigh
et al., 2014)
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robot exposure and violations and penalties would be consistent with increased compliance
with OSHA regulations or the displacement of more dangerous occupations.
3.4 Control Variables
The models include control variables provided by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2021):
log of the population, share of females, share aged 65 and older, shares of educational attain-
ment (no college, some college, college professional degree, and masters or doctoral degree),
shares of race (Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians), share of employment in manufac-
turing, share of employment in light manufacturing, and share of female employment in
manufacturing. These data come from the US Census. The models also include measures
of import competition from China (Autor et al., 2013) and the share of routine occupations
(Autor and Dorn, 2013).
4 Industry Correlations
We first examine industry-level correlations between robot penetration and work-
place safety. One consideration is whether robot penetration was correlated with more dan-
gerous industries. To explore this question, Figure 3 plots the relationship between robot
penetration between 1993 and 2007 and workplace safety in 1993, where the relative sizes
of the scatter points are proportional to the relative employment in each industry. Panel A
corresponds to the TRC rate from the BLS, and panel B corresponds to the OSHA accident
rate from the IMIS. As shown, the linear relationship in both figures is positive, indicating
that more dangerous industries experienced greater robot penetration. To quantify these
correlations, we regress changes in robot penetration on baseline workplace safety in 1993
weighted by employment in 1993. The coefficient on workplace safety is positive for both
the TRC rate and OSHA accident rate, but only the former is statistically significant.
We next consider whether robot penetration was correlated with changes in work-
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place safety during the analysis period. To explore this question, Figure 4 plots the rela-
tionship between robot penetration and workplace safety using the stacked-model changes
between 1993 and 2000 and 2000 and 2007. Again, panel A corresponds to the TRC rate
from the BLS, and panel B corresponds to the OSHA accident rate from the IMIS. As shown,
the linear relationship in both figures is negative, indicating that greater robot penetration
was associated with a reduction in workplace accidents. To quantify these correlations, we
regress changes in workplace safety on changes in robot penetration. The regression results
are reported in Table 1. Panels A and B correspond to the long difference and stacked
differences, respectively, and columns (1) and (2) correspond to the TRC rate and OSHA
accident rate, respectively. In all specifications, industry-level observations are weighted by
baseline employment. As shown, the negative relationship between robot penetration and
workplace safety is negative and statistically significant. Moreoever, the results are robust
to long difference versus stacked differences. These results indicate that robot penetration
by industry was associated with improvements in workplace safety.
We next consider whether the negative correlations illustrated in Figure 4 may
simply reflect trends in workplace safety before 1993. To explore this question, Figure 5 plots
the relationship between robot penetration from 1993 to 2007 and changes in workplace safety
from 1986 to 1993. In contrast to Figure 4, the relationship between robot penetration and
workplace safety is not negative and, in fact, may be positive with respect to the TRC rate
in panel A. It should be noted, however, that workplace accidents were generally increasing
from 1986 to 1993 in Figure 5, but generally decreasing from 1993 to 2007 in Figure 4. To
quantify the correlations in Figure 5, we regress changes in workplace safety from 1986 to
1993 on changes in robot penetration from 1993 to 2007 weighted by employment in 1993.
The regression results are reported in Table 2. As shown, both estimates are small and
statistically insignificant.
We also consider whether robot penetration was correlated with changes in OSHA
enforcement at the industry level. To explore this question, Figure 6 plots the relationship
11
between robot penetration and measures of OSHA enforcement using stacked differences
between 1993 and 2000 and 2000 and 2007. As shown, there does not appear to be a
systematic relationship between robot penetration and OSHA enforcement. The relationship
with any inspection appears positive, whereas the relationship with violations and penalties
appears zero or slightly negative. To quantify these correlations, we regress changes in OSHA
enforcement on changes in robot penetration. The regression results are reported in Table 1.
In addition to any violation and penalty as outcome variables, the table reports results for
the number of violations and penalty amounts. As shown, most of the coefficients are small
and statistically insignificant. One exception is any inspection, which appears to increase
with robot penetration using stacked differences. The other exception is penalty amounts,
which appears to decrease with robot penetration using both the long difference and stacked
differences. Taken together, the results suggest that robot penetration was associated with
an increase OSHA inspections, if at all, but was negatively associated with the amount
of penalties levied on establishments as a result of an inspection. If OSHA penalties are
indicative of workplace hazards and predictive of workplace accidents, the results suggest
that robot penetration was associated with improvements in workplace safety.
5 Commuting Zone
5.1 Baseline Results
We next attempt to identify the causal effect of robot exposure on workplace safety
by exploiting potentially exogenous variation in exposure at the commuting zone level. The
baseline results come from estimating equation (1) using the European based measure of
robot penetration given by equation (4). The results are presented in Table 3. Panels A and
B correspond to the long difference and stacked differences, respectively. In all specifications,
the outcome variable is expressed as changes in the natural log, and control variables are
12
included.
Column (1) reports the results for the OSHA accident rate. As shown, the coef-
ficient on robot penetration is negative using both long difference and stacked differences,
but the coefficient is an order of magnitude larger using stacked differences. In that case,
the coefficient implies that one additional robot in exposure per 1,000 employees decreased
the OSHA accident rate at the mean by 15.7 percent. The estimated effect should be in-
terpreted with caution, however, given that the estimate is not robust to the long difference
specification and is statistically significant only at the ten percent level.
Columns (2) through (6) report the results for OSHA enforcement. In most cases,
robot exposure appears to have decreased measures of OSHA enforcement, but for some
measures the magnitudes and statistical significance differ between the long difference and
stacked differences. In column (2), robot exposure appears to have decreased OSHA inspec-
tions, but the effect is larger and statistically significant using the long difference model.
In columns (3) and (4), robot exposure appears to have decreased the rate of any viola-
tion as well as the number of violations. The estimates for any violation are similar using
the long difference and stacked differences, but is statistically significant using stacked dif-
ferences only. The estimates for the number of violations differ in sign, magnitude, and
statistical significance between specifications, with the effect larger, negative, and statisti-
cally significant using stacked differences. In columns (5) and (6), robot penetration appears
to have decreased the rate of any penalty as well as the penalty amount. The magnitude
and statistical significance of the estimates for any penalty are robust to long versus stacked
differences, whereas the estimate for the penalty amount is larger and statistically significant
using stacked differences. Taken together, the results suggest that robot exposure decreased
measures of OSHA enforcement, specifically inspections, violations, and penalties. As stated,
if violations and penalties are indicative of workplace hazards and predictive of workplace
accidents, the results suggest that robot exposure improved workplace safety.
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5.2 Results by Period
In the preceding analysis, we follow the convention of Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2020) by estimating long differences between 1993 and 2007 and stacked differences between
1993 and 2000 and between 2000 and 2007. However, for many outcomes we consider, the
results differ in magnitude and statistical significance across specifications.
One possible explanation is that the variation in robot penetration between the two
periods is driven by different industries and that the effect of robot penetration on workplace
safety differs by industry. To examine this possibility, Figure 7 illustrates the correlation
between robot penetration from 1993 to 2000 and from 2000 and 2007 by industry in Europe.
As shown, early robot penetration is highly correlated with later robot penetration: the
intra-industry correlation weighted by employment in 1993 is 0.94. This suggests that the
variation in robot penetration was driven largely by the same indutries in both periods.
Another possible explanation is that robots adopted in the earlier period affected
workplace safety differently than robots adopted in the later period, or that the effect of
robot adoption on workplace safety is lagged with respect to the timing of adoption. To
examine these possibilities, we estimate the models in Tables 1 and 3 separately by period.
The results are presented in Tables 4 and Table 5, respectively. As shown, the negative
effects for BLS TRC rate, the OSHA accident rate, and OSHA enforcement rates reported
in the baseline results appear to be driven by robot penetration between 2000 and 2007.
For that period, one additional robot in exposure decreased OSHA accidents at the mean
by 15.1 percent, which is statistically signficant at the ten percent level. These results are
consistent with both possible explanations: either robots adopted between 2000 and 2007
were more effective at reducing OSHA accidents and enforcement, or the safety effects of
robot adoption between 1993 and 2000 do not manifest until 2000 and 2007. The latter
explanation is possible because, as previously stated, robot penetration by industry is highly
correlated between the two periods.
14
5.3 US-Based Measure of Robot Exposure
We next consider whether the baseline results are robust to using the US-based
measure of robot penetration in equation (5), instrumented by the European-based measure
in equation (4). We calculate the US-based measure using the available data during the
analysis period, from 2004 to 2007, rescaled to reflect robot penetration over seven years,
from 1993 to 2000 and 2000 to 2007.
The instrumental variable results using stacked differences, presented in Table 6,
are consistent with the baseline results presented in Table 3. For example, the effect of
robot exposure on the OSHA accident rate is -0.16 in Table 6 and -0.29 in Table 3. Both
estimates are statistically significant at the ten percent level. The estimated effects on OSHA
enforcement are also consistently negative in both tables, with the magnitudes slightly larger
using instrumental variables. The robustness of the results reflect that the US-based measure
is highly correlated with the European-based measure, as documented by Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2020).
5.4 OSHA Violations by Type
The commuting zone results show that robot exposure decreased OSHA violations.
To understand the mechanism for these results, we further examine whether the effect varied
by violation type. This may have occurred for two reasons. First, violations differ by
nature, and robots may have been more effective at reducing some types of violation than
others. Second, robot penetration varied by industry, and some violations are more common
in some industries than others. Using information on the nature of OSHA violations, we
first categorized violations into broad categories using OSHA regulation standards and then
estimated the effect of robot exposure on the ten most frequent violations.
The results are presented in Table 7. The first column lists the most frequent
violations, and the second column presents the estimated effect of robot exposure for each
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violation. The empirical specifications are identical to column (2) of Table 3 using stacked
differences. To convey the relative frequency of each violation, the third column reports the
violation rate per 1,000 establishments. As shown, the four most frequent violations are
toxic and hazardous substances, machinery and machine guarding, electrical, and general
environmental controls. According to the regression results, the estimated effect of robot
exposure is small and statistically insignificant for the most frequent violation, toxic and
hazardous substances. For the other three violations, the estimated effect is negative and
statistically significant, with the largest point estimate for the second most frequent violation,
machinery and machine guarding.
The different results in Table 7 may simply reflect heterogeneous effects, indepen-
dent of robot penetration by industry. However, if the different results reflect that robot
penetration varied by industry, and that some violations occurred more frequently in some
industries than others, then the effect sizes would be systematically correlated with robot
penetration. To examine this possibility, the final column reports an index of robot penetra-
tion for each violation. To construct the index, we first tally the number of OSHA violations
by IFR industry and violation type. For each violation type, we then calculate the share
attributable to each industry. Finally, we use these shares as weights to calculate the aver-
age robot penetration from 1993 to 2007 for each violation. If all violations occurred in one
industry, for example, then the robot index would equal the change in robots from 1993 and
2007 in that industry, regardless of that industry’s size or the frequency of the violation.
Interestingly, among the top two most frequent violations, the effect of robot ex-
posure on OSHA violations appears larger for violations with greater exposure to robot
penetration. In first is hazardous substances, which had less robot exposure and where the
effect of robot exposure was smaller and statistically insignificant. In second is machinery,
which had more robot exposure and where the effect of robot exposure was larger and sta-
tistically significant. The next two violations - electrical and general environmental controls
- fall between the first two violations with respect to both effect sizes and robot penetra-
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tion. Beyond the top four, the relationship between effect sizes and robot penetration is
not apparent, but these violations were also much less frequent. Taken together, the results
suggest that the negative effects of robot exposure on OSHA violations was due in part to
violations most exposed to robot penetration.
5.5 OSHA Accidents by Type
Given the results by type of OSHA violation in Table 7, we examine whether the
decline in violations by type corresponds with a decline in accidents by type. To identify the
latter, we search for keywords in the annotated descriptions of the accident included in the
IMIS. Specifically, using data in 1993, we search for the keywords “toxic” and “hazardous”
for “Toxic and Hazardous Substances,” “machine” and “machinery” for “Machinery and
Machine Guarding,” and “electrical” for “Electrical.” These keywords correspond to the top
three violations listed in Table 7: toxic and hazardous substances, machinery and machine
guarding, and electrical, respectively. We find that the accident rate with the keyword toxic
to be rare: a rate of 0.080 per 100,000 workers, accounting for about 1 percent of all accidents.
The accident rates with the keywords machinery and electrical are more common: rates of
0.430 and 0.265, respectively, accounting for 15 percent of all accidents. We therefore focus
on the accident rates with the keywords machinery and electrical.
The results are presented in Table 8. The empirical specifications are identical to
column (1) of Table 3 using stacked differences. In the first column, the point estimate for
accidents involving machinery is -0.11. The estimate is smaller than the baseline estimate
of -0.15 in Table 3, but is statistically significant at the five percent level. In the second
column, the point estimate for accidents involving electrical is -0.18, which is statistically
significant at the ten percent level. The third column reports the effect for accidents not
involving mechanical or electrical, which comprise 85 percent of all accidents. In this case, the
estimate is only -0.14 and not statistically significant. These results, combined with Table 7,
indicate that greater robot exposure was associated with fewer violations and accidents
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involving mechanical and electrical, which were both more frequent and more exposed to
robot penetration compared to other types of violations and accidents.
6 Magnitudes and Mechanisms
The empirical strategy identifies the effect of robot exposure on workplace safety
by exploiting variation in exposure across US commuting zones. The results indicate that
robot exposure improved workplace safety in affected commuting zones, and the effects were
concentrated between 2000 and 2007. During that period, one additional robot in exposure
per 1,000 workers decreased OSHA accidents at the mean by 15.1 percent, and the average
increase in robot exposure weighted by employment was 1.38 per 1,000 workers. Thus, the
average effect at the mean across commuting zones was 20.8 percent, compared to an average
OSHA rate in 2000 of 4.92 per 100,000 workers. It should be noted, however, that point
estimate is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level and thus does not rule out
a wide range of effects. A smaller but more statistically significant effect was obtained for
OSHA accidents involving machinery.
The effect of robot exposure reflects not only the direct effect of robots on workplace
safety, but the spillover and agglomeration effects within commuting zones. In this context,
a spillover effect would occur if improvements in workplace safety due to robot technology in
one establishment forces other establishments, in equilibrium, to improve workplace safety,
which may be accomplished with or without industrial robots. An agglomeration effect would
arise if robot adoption by one establishment reduces the cost of robot adoption for nearby
establishments. Agglomeration economies seem plausible given that robot integrators, an
indicator of robot activity, are concentrated in only 19 percent of US commuting zones.12
The effect of robot exposure reflects safety improvements within employment, the
displacement of more dangerous employment, or both. On one hand, Graetz and Michaels
12This number is calculated using data from Leigh and Kraft (2018) and provided by Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2020).
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(2018) find no effect of industrial robots on employment. In this case, the improvements
in workplace safety reflect a decrease in workplace hazards in the same occupations or a
shift in employment towards occupations or tasks that pose fewer workplace hazards. On
the other hand, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) find negative effects of industiral robots
on employment. In this case, the improvements in workplace safety may also reflect the
displacement of dangerous jobs. This seems plausible, as the negative employment effects of
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) are most evident in manufacturing and blue-collar, routine
manual occupations.
The average effect at the mean is large compared to aggregate trends in workplace
safety during the same period. For example, from 2000 to 2007, the OSHA rate itself de-
clined by only 6.91 percent, from 4.92 to 4.58 per 100,000 workers.13 A possible explanation
is that, at the commuting zone level, the effect of robot exposure on workplace safety in-
creases exponentially with exposure, perhaps due to spillover or agglomeration effects. To
examine this possibility, we estimate the stacked differences model in Table 3 with robot
exposure squared and find that only the coefficient on the squared term is both negative
and statistically significant.14 This suggests that the negative effect of robot exposure on
workplace safety is driven by commuting zones with relatively high levels of exposure.
7 Conclusion
During the past three decades, workplace accidents and fatalities decreased as the
penetration of industrial robots increased. In this paper, we attempt to identify the causal
effect of industrial robots on workplace safety at the commuting zone level. For identification,
following Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020), we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in robot
13In comparison, the BLS TRC rate declined by 31.1 percent, from 6.1 to 4.2 per 1,000 full-time equivalent
workers; and the BLS fatality rate declined by 11.6 percent, from 4.3 to 3.8 per 100,000 full-time equivalent
workers.
14The point estimate for robot exposure is 0.151 (0.106), and the point estimate for robot exposure squared
is -0.041 (0.011).
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exposure based on the industry composition and robot penetration by industry. We find
negative and statistically significant effects of robot exposure on OSHA accidents, violations,
and penalties. These effects are concentrated between 2000 and 2007, rather than 1993 to
2000, which may reflect heterogenous effects across time or lagged effects from the early
period to the later period. In the later period, one additional robot in exposure decreased
the OSHA accident rate at the mean by 15.1 percent. We also find that the effect of robots
is more evident for more frequent accidents and violations that were more exposed to robot
penetration, specifically those involving machinery and electrical. The estimated effects
reflect not only the direct effect of robot exposure on workplace safety, but also spillover and
agglomeration effects within commuting zones.
While this study focuses on robot exposure due to techonological progress, one
question that arises is the firm-level decision to adopt industrial robots. In a model of the
firm, the optimal level of robots occurs where marginal revenue product of robots equals
the marginal cost, accounting for technological substitutabilities between industrial robots,
standard capital, and labor. Subsumed in this model are interesting factors related to work-
place safety, including risk-aversion of labor, compensating wage differentials, and workers
compensation policy. For example, more punititive workers compensation policy to pro-
tect workers may also hasten the displacement of employment, particularly when labor is
highly risk averse. These questions are important directions for future research, especially




Acemoglu, D., Lelarge, C., and Restrepo, P. (2020). Competing with robots: Firm-level
evidence from France. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 110:383–388.
Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. (2020). Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets.
Journal of Political Economy, 128(6):2188–2244.
Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. (2021). Data for Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor
Markets. economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu/data/robotsjobs.
Autor, D. and Dorn, D. (2013). The growth of low-skill service jobs and the polarization of
the US labor market. American Economic Review, 103(5):1553–1597.
Autor, D., Dorn, D., and Hanson, G. (2013). The china syndrom: Local labor market effects
of import competition in the United States. American Economic Review, 103(6):2121–
2168.
Bartik, T. (1991). Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?
W.E. Upjohn Institute.
Dauth, W., Findeisen, S., Suedekum, J., and Woessner, N. (2021). The Adjustment of La-
bor Markets to Robots. drive.google.com/file/d/1dNv9lbduNUBzUuqwTxcFngD9JgXT-
TKk/view.
Dinlersoz, E. and Wolf, Z. (2018). Automation, labor share, and productivity: Plant-level ev-
idence from US manufacturing. US Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies Working
Paper 18-39.
Findeisen, S., Sudekum, J., and Wobner, N. (2021). The adjustment of labor markets to
robots. Journal of the European Economic Association. Forthcoming.
Gihleb, R., Giuntella, O., Stella, L., and Wang, T. (2020). Industrial robots, workers’ safety,
and health. IZA Discussion Paper Series.
21
Graetz, G. and Michaels, G. (2018). Robots at work. Review of Economics and Statistics,
100(5):753–768.
International Federation of Robotics (2014). World robotics: Industrial robots. Technical
Paper.
Kugler, A., Kugler, M., Ripani, L., and Rodrigo, R. (2020). US robotics and their impacts
in the tropics: Evidence from Columbian labor markets. NBER Working Paper 28034.
Lee, J. and Taylor, L. (2019). Randomized safety inspections and risk exposure on the job:
Quasi-experimental estimates of the value of statistical life. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 11(4):350–374.
Leigh, J. P., Du, J., and McCurdy, S. (2014). An estimate of the US government’s undercount
of nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses in agriculture. Annals of Epidemiology,
24(2):254–259.
Leigh, N. G. and Kraft, B. (2018). Emerging robotic regions in the United States: Insights
for regional economic evolution. Regional Studies, 52(6):804–815.
OSHA (2021). Integrated Management Information System. enforcedata.dol.gov/views/
data summary.php.
Rosen, S. (1974). Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Produce differentiation in pure
competition. Journal of Political Economy, 82(1):34–55.
Sojourner, A. and Yang, J. (2020). Effects of union certification on workplace-safety enforce-
ment: Regression-discontinuity evidence. Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
22
Table 1: The Effect of Robot Exposure on Workplace Safety, Industry Level
BLS TRC OSHA Accident Inspections Violations Penalties
Number Any Number Any Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Long Difference
Robots -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.021***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
B. Stacked Difference
Robots -0.018*** -0.014** 0.014** 0.020 -0.002 0.016 -0.022***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
The unit of observation is industry as defined by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture. The
BLS TRC (total recordable case) rate is the number of workplace injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time equivalent workers.
The OSHA accident rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000 workers. The OSHA
enforcement variables - inspections, violations, and penalties - reflect all inspections, not just accidents, expressed per 1,000
establishments. The outcome variables are calculated as the change in natural log, and robot exposure is calculated as the
change in level. Panel A shows the long-difference estimates from 1993 to 2007, and panel B shows the stacked-difference
estimates from 1993 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2007. Observations are weighted by the baseline employment. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: The Effect of Robot Exposure on Pre-Existing Trend in
Workplace Safety, Industry Level
BLS TRC OSHA Accident
(1) (2)
Robot Exposure 0.007 -0.0002
(0.007) (0.004)
Observations 18 18
The unit of observation is industry as defined by the International Federation of Robotics
(IFR), excluding agriculture. The BLS TRC (total recordable case) rate is the number of
workplace injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time equivalent workers. The OSHA accident
rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000 workers.
The outcome variables are calculated as the change in natural log, and robot exposure is
calculated as the change in level. The outcome variable is measured from 1986 to 1993, and
the robot exposure variable is measured from 1993 to 2007. Observations are weighted by
the baseline employment. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: The Effect of Robot Exposure on Workplace Safety, Commuting
Zone Level
OSHA Inspections Violations Penalty
Accident Number Any Number Any Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Long Difference
Robots -0.017 -0.050* -0.040 0.004 -0.067*** 0.022
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.029)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722
B: Stacked Difference
Robots -0.157* -0.003 -0.037* -0.071** -0.053*** -0.111***
(0.088) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.041)
Observations 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444
The unit of observation is US commuting zones. The OSHA accident rate is the number work-
ers involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000 workers. The OSHA enforcement
variables - inspections, violations, and penalties - reflect all inspections, not just accidents,
expressed per 1,000 establishments. The outcome variables are calculated as the change in
natural log, and robot exposure is calculated as the change in level. The covariates include
time period dummies, census division dummies, demographic characteristics, manufactur-
ing share, exposure to Chinese imports and the share of routine jobs. Panel A shows the
long-difference estimates from 1993 to 2007, and panel B shows the stacked-difference esti-
mates from 1993 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2007. Observations are weighted by the baseline
employment. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4: The Effect of Robot Exposure on Workplace Safety by Period, Industry Level
BLS OSHA Inspections Violations Penalties
TRC Accident Number Any Number Any Number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Robots, 1993 to 2000 -0.004 0.0006 0.009 0.008 0.008 -0.007 -0.028***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
Robots, 2000 to 2007 -0.025*** -0.021*** 0.017* 0.026** -0.006 0.028* -0.019***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004)
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
The unit of observation is industry as defined by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture. The
BLS TRC (total recordable case) rate is the number of workplace injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time equivalent workers.
The OSHA accident rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000 workers. The OSHA
enforcement variables - inspections, violations, and penalties - reflect all inspections, not just accidents, expressed per 1,000
establishments. The outcome variables are calculated as the change in natural log, and robot exposure is calculated as the
change in level. Observations are weighted by the baseline employment. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: The Effect of Robot Exposure on Workplace Safety by Period, Commuting Zone Level
OSHA Inspections Violations Penalty
Accident Number Any Number Any Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Robots, 1993 to 2000 0.029 0.064 0.109 0.191* 0.031 0.001
(0.142) (0.097) (0.090) (0.099) (0.095) (0.133)
Robots, 2000 to 2007 -0.151* -0.002 -0.037* -0.071*** -0.053*** -0.108***
(0.078) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.036)
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444
The unit of observation is US commuting zones. The OSHA accident rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected
accident per 100,000 workers. The OSHA enforcement variables - inspections, violations, and penalties - reflect all inspections,
not just accidents, expressed per 1,000 establishments. The outcome variables are calculated as the change in natural log, and
robot exposure is calculated as the change in level. The covariates include time period dummies, census division dummies,
demographic characteristics, manufacturing share, exposure to Chinese imports and the share of routine jobs. Observations are
weighted by the baseline employment. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6: The Effect of Robot Exposure on Workplace Safety, Commuting Zone Level, US-Based
Measure of Robots with Instrumental Variables
OSHA Accident Inspections Violations Penalty
Number Any Number Any Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US Robots -0.287* -0.005 -0.071 -0.136 -0.101 -0.206
(0.154) (0.035) (0.033) (0.045) (0.033) (0.072)
Observations 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444
The unit of observation is US commuting zones. The OSHA accident rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected
accident per 100,000 workers. The OSHA enforcement variables - inspections, violations, and penalties - reflect all inspections,
not just accidents, expressed per 1,000 establishments. The US-based measure of robot penetration is calculated using data
from 2004 to 2007, rescaled to seven years. The US-based measure is instrumented with the European-based measure from 1993
to 2007. The outcome variables are calculated as the change in natural log, and robot exposure is calculated as the change in
level. The covariates include time period dummies, census division dummies, demographic characteristics, manufacturing share,
exposure to Chinese imports and the share of routine jobs. The results come from the stacked-difference model from 1993 to
2000 and from 2000 to 2007. Observations are weighted by the baseline employment. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 7: The Effect of Robot Exposure on OSHA Violation Type,
Commuting Zone Level
Robots Violation Robot Exposure
Violation Type Estimate Rate Index
Toxic and Hazardous Substances -0.023 6.93 5.29
(0.046)
Machinery and Machine Guarding -0.236*** 5.37 7.00
(0.041)
Electrical -0.150** 4.90 6.35
(0.074)
General Environmental Controls -0.123** 3.27 6.98
(0.050)
Hazardous Materials 0.020 2.36 7.94
(0.042)
Personal Protective Equipment -0.153 2.15 6.62
(0.111)
Walking-Working Surfaces -0.130*** 1.74 6.70
(0.040)
Exit Routes and Emergency Planning -0.042 1.36 6.14
(0.053)
Fire Protection -0.169* 1.16 6.51
(0.090)
Materials Handling and Storage 0.013 1.12 8.54
(0.036)
Observations 1,444
The unit of observation is US commuting zones. Each estimate comes from a single re-
gression. The OSHA violation rate is calculated as the number of violations by type per
1,000 establishments. The covariates include time period dummies, census division dum-
mies, demographic characteristics, manufacturing share, exposure to Chinese imports and
the share of routine jobs. All estimates come from the long-difference estimates from 1993
to 2007. Observations are weighted by the baseline employment. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. The OSHA violation rate reported in the third column is calculated in 1993.
The robot exposure index reflects the extent to which each violation type was exposed to
robots based on violation rates in 1993 and robot exposure from 1993 to 2007.
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Robots -0.105** -0.180* -0.140
(0.046) (0.099) (0.086)
OSHA Accident Rate 0.430 0.265 4.583
Observations 1444 1444 1444
The unit of observation is US commuting zones. Each estimate comes from a single re-
gression. The OSHA accident rate is calculated as the number of accidents by type per
1,000 establishments. The covariates include time period dummies, census division dum-
mies, demographic characteristics, manufacturing share, exposure to Chinese imports and
the share of routine jobs. All estimates come from the long-difference estimates from 1993
to 2007. Observations are weighted by the baseline employment. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. The OSHA accident rate is calculated in 1993.
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The BLS TRC (total recordable case) rate is the number of workplace injuries and illnesses
per 100 full-time equivalent workers, and the BLS fatality rate is the number of workplace
fatalities per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers. Both figures come from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Office of Safety, Health, and Working Conditions. Industrial robots are
the number of robots per 1,000 workers in the US and in five European countries, including
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden. The data on industrial robots come from the
International Federation of Robotics.
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B. BLS Fatality Rate
Each marker corresponds to an industry as defined by the International Federation of
Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture. The OSHA accident rate is the number workers
involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000 workers. The BLS TRC (total record-
able case) rate is the number of workplace injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time equivalent
workers. The BLS fatality rate is the number of workplace fatalities per 100,000 full-time
equivalent workers. The marker size is proportional to employment data from the County
Business Patterns. The weighted correlations in Panels A and B are 0.58 and 0.92, respec-
tively.
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Figure 3: Workplace Safety and Robot Exposure by Industry, Safety
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B. OSHA Accident Rate
Each marker corresponds to an industry as defined by the International Federation of
Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture. The BLS TRC (total recordable case) rate is the
number of workplace injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time equivalent workers. The OSHA
accident rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000
workers. The marker size is proportional to employment data from the County Business
Patterns. Workplace safety is measured in 1993. The exposure to robots is the change in
number of robots per 1,000 workers by industry from 1993 to 2007 in five European countries,
including Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden.
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Figure 4: Workplace Safety and Robot Exposure by Industry, Stacked
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B. OSHA Accident Rate
Each marker corresponds to an industry as defined by the International Federation of
Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture. The BLS TRC (total recordable case) rate is the
number of workplace injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time equivalent workers. The OSHA
accident rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000
workers. The marker size is proportional to employment data from the County Business
Patterns. The exposure to robots is measured as the number of robots per 1,000 workers by
industry in five European countries, including Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden.
The workplace safety figures are differenced in logs between 1993 and 2000 and 2000 to 2007,
and the exposure to robot figures are differenced in levels during the same periods.
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Figure 5: Workplace Safety and Robot Exposure by Industry, Safety
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Robot Exposure
B. OSHA Accident Rate
Each marker corresponds to an industry as defined by the International Federation of
Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture. The BLS TRC (total recordable case) rate is the
number of workplace injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time equivalent workers. The OSHA
accident rate is the number workers involved in an OSHA-inspected accident per 100,000
workers. The marker size is proportional to employment data from the County Business
Patterns. The exposure to robots is measured as the number of robots per 1,000 workers by
industry in five European countries, including Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden.
The workplace safety figures are differenced in logs between 1986 and 1993, and the exposure
to robot figures are differenced in levels between 1993 to 2007.
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Figure 6: Inspections, Violations, and Penalties and Robot Exposure by Industry, Stacked Differences
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C. Penalties (dollars)
Each marker corresponds to an industry as defined by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture.
The OSHA inspection and violation rates are the number per 1,000 establishments, and the penalty is the amount in 2020
dollars per 1,000 establishments. The number of establishments are tabulated from the CBP. All three measures are calculated
using a three-year lead average. The marker size is proportional to employment data from the County Business Patterns. The
exposure to robots is measured as the number of robots per 1,000 workers by industry in five European countries, including
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden. The inspection figures are differenced in logs between 1993 and 2000 and 2000
to 2007, and the exposure to robot figures are differenced in levels during the same periods.
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Figure 7: Inspections, Violations, and Penalties and Robot Exposure by
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Robot Exposure 1993 to 2000
Each marker corresponds to an industry as defined by the International Federation of
Robotics (IFR), excluding agriculture. The exposure to robots is measured as the num-
ber of robots per 1,000 workers by industry in five European countries, including Denmark,
Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden.
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